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Introduction: The Pieces of Housing Integration 
Moving Toward Integration1 is an exceedingly thorough work that 
is indispensable to searching conversations about how to achieve racial 
integration in housing in the twenty-first century. The book makes a 
substantial contribution to the literature concerning housing policies, 
 
†  Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, American Bar 
Foundation Visiting Scholar, J.D. Harvard Law School, Ph.D. Duke 
University. I would like to thank Case Western Reserve University School 
of Law for inviting me to participate in the symposium on the book 
Moving Toward Integration. 
1. Richard H. Sander et al., Moving Toward Integration: The 
Past and Future of Fair Housing (2018). 
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racial relations, the history of black and white segregation in the United 
States, and the potential for racial integration in residential housing. It 
adopts an impressive interdisciplinary approach to the subject matter 
and has several main purposes and goals. First, it affirms the value of 
racial integration and how impactful it is on individual lives. Second, it 
seeks to identify and understand patterns of migration of racial 
populations within the United States. The primary emphasis is on 
African Americans and whites. Third, it draws upon historical and 
current data from a variety of resources and time periods to examine 
contributing factors to segregation, resegregation, and integration. 
Fourth, the work offers a productive analysis of policies, programs, and 
laws adopted in the past concerning housing, lending, segregation, and 
integration, with a view towards extracting lessons. Fifth, the book 
offers well-considered solutions and strategies. 
The solutions such as mobility grants and community banks are 
intriguing, thoughtful, and worth exploring. I examine those strategies 
herein. I argue that it is necessary to be mindful that, with new 
initiatives, the old issues of implementation, lack of political will, and 
graft may arise. There are numerous places where I agree with the 
book’s analysis and recommendations; there are also important places 
where we differ. My comments fall under several headings: definition of 
structural discrimination and structural segregation; troubling issues 
with respect to courts, developers, and banks; reflections on disparate 
impact theory; and the public’s will to integrate. 
I. Structure and Approach 
The book’s authors, Richard Sander, Yana Kucheva, and Jonathan 
Zasloff, adopt a constructive strategy in tackling integration as a puzzle. 
That approach is efficacious because it allows for a more comprehensive 
explanation of the dynamics leading to the status quo, which is the  
unintegrated state of many communities across the United States. The 
authors recognize that identifying the root causes of segregation and 
resegregation, as well as effective incentives for integration, are germane 
components of the analysis. Another aspect of their strategy is 
referencing key court decisions, such as Buchanan v. Warley,2 Shelley 
v. Kramer,3 the Mount Laurel cases,4 Jones v. Mayer,5 and essential 
 
2. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
3. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
4. Southern Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 290 
A.2d 465 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972); Davis Enters. v. Township of 
Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). 
5. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
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legislation such as the Fair Housing Act,6 as watershed organizing 
moments. The book examines how each has impacted the terrain. 
II. Structural Discrimination and Structural 
Segregation 
My definitions of structural discrimination and structural 
segregation differ from that of Moving Toward Integration’s authors. 
Relying upon their definition, the authors conclude that “structural 
segregation (like housing discrimination) is relatively low.”7 Their 
definition of “structural segregation” concerns “that portion of racial 
segregation that results from racial differences in income, wealth, family 
size, and other sociodemographic characteristics.”8 Although my 
definition is sufficiently capacious to encapsulate the foregoing 
elements, my emphasis is on structures and institutions and their 
respective policies and practices. I am not asserting that there is no 
value in measuring the racial segregation  associated with the 
characteristics the authors highlight. Rather, I argue that government 
at all levels—federal, state, and local— and lending institutions were 
prominent actors in the history of racially segregating communities. 
Appreciating the complex operations and effects of those structures is 
indispensable to rendering an accurate account of contemporary racial 
housing patterns and devising solutions for change. Systemic 
discrimination, persistently, has functioned to maintain racially 
segregated cities and neighborhoods.9 Moreover, systemic 
discrimination has produced and sustained substantial racial inequality 
in many areas including income, wealth, employment, and education. 
These socio-demographic variables profoundly influence housing 
selection decisions.  
As a strategy to highlight the role of structures in accordance with 
how I conceptualize them, I analyze Texas Department of Housing and 
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,10 Bank of 
America Corp. v. City of Miami,11 and the Department of Justice’s 2012 
 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).  
7. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 439. 
8. Id. at 424. 
9. Angela Hanks et al., Systematic Inequality: How America’s Structural 
Racism Helped Create the Black–White Wealth Gap, Ctr. for Am. 
Progress (Feb. 21, 2018, 9:03 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/ 
 issues/race/reports/2018/02/21/447051/systematic-inequality/ [https:// 
 perma.cc/JNW8-WFW7]. 
10. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
11. 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017). 
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settlement with Wells Fargo.12 These examples illustrate how 
government, powerful players, such as developers and banks, work to 
perpetuate socio-economic racial exclusion that continues to harm 
African-American communities. 
III. Troubling Issues with Respect to Local 
Government, Developers, and Courts 
The following discussion is a prelude to my analysis of Moving 
Toward Integration’s proposal that mobility grants should be utilized 
as one strategy to foster integration.13 While I see tremendous positives 
in proposing such grants as one solution, I am also cautious because of 
how incentives have been subverted in the past.14 
A. Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities (2015) 
Inclusive Communities exemplifies how a potentially robust tool 
such as disparate-impact liability can be stripped of its power and 
effectively neutralized so that the Fair Housing Act is prevented from 
performing the integrative work it was intended to do. Inclusive 
Communities demonstrates that government, encompassing its various 
instrumentalities (legislative, administrative, municipal, state, and 
federal), and courts, can frustrate integration goals. The FHA was the 
 
12. Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Wells Fargo Resulting in 
More Than $175 Million in Relief for Homeowners to Resolve Fair 
Lending Claims, Dep’t of Just., https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-reaches-settlement-wells-fargo-resulting-more-175-million-relief 
[https://perma.cc/56VV-T98U] (last updated Oct. 8, 2014). 
13. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 423–29. 
14. Although presented by local government as a win–win vehicle to revitalize 
areas desperately in need of development and economic stimulus, in some 
areas the financial gains of Tax Increment Financing (TIFs) have been 
appropriated for other purposes, ultimately harming communities they 
were purportedly intended to benefit. See Anthony Flint, The Hidden 
Costs of TIF, Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, https://www.lincolninst.edu/ 
 publications/articles/hidden-costs-tif [https://perma.cc/P8RC-6C7B] (last 
visited June 1, 2020); David Merriman, Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, 
Improving Tax Increment Financing (TIF) for Economic 
Development (2018), available at https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/ 
 policy-focus-reports/improving-tax-increment-financing-tif-economic-
development [https://perma.cc/3REV-X9SC].  
 Both Flint’s article and Merriman’s report discuss TIF issues that impact 
residential racial integration and the financial well-being of communities. 
Moving Toward Integration’s authors also address some of TIFs shortfalls. 
The lesson I take from TIFs and other incentive programs is that 
transparency and thoughtful oversight by those committed to the stated 
objective (e.g., racial integration) are essential. 
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primary vehicle through which the Inclusive Communities plaintiffs 
formulated their complaint. Moving Toward Integration also gives 
attention to Inclusive Communities and expresses optimism regarding 
the court’s ruling on disparate-impact theory.15 The book’s authors 
appropriately focus on the Fair Housing Act as being fundamental to 
the work of integration. 
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (“ICP” or “Inclusive 
Communities”) initiated its case against Texas Department of Housing 
and Community Affairs (“TDHCA” or “Texas Department of 
Housing”) when it brought suit alleging that TDHCA violated the FHA 
by distributing low-income-housing tax credits in a manner that 
perpetuated housing segregation patterns.16 As a non-profit 
organization working primarily with African Americans to assist them 
with identifying affordable rental housing that would accept Section 8 
vouchers,17 Inclusive Communities was frustrated by the paucity of 
housing choices available to its clients. According to ICP, too often the 
limited options were situated in over-concentrated urban areas in 
Dallas, Texas.18 These neighborhoods typically lacked decent school 
choices and did not have adequate municipal services, such as road 
maintenance, waste management, fire and police protection, parks, and 
other safe public spaces. 
Administration of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (“LIHTC”) 
was the central focus of the case.19 Moving Toward Integration examines 
LIHTC in detail, drawing important lessons regarding how to structure 
incentives for encouraging racially-integrated affordable housing 
options.20 The LIHTC program is federally authorized. It operates to 
monetarily incentivize developers to build affordable housing. Initiated 
by the federal government in 1986, it is the “largest single source of 
funding for the development of low-income rental housing.”21 The 
 
15. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 442–44. 
16. Tx. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 2507, 2514 (2015). 
17. Section 8 vouchers are part of a federally authorized housing-subsidy 
program. Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of Housing, 
https://www.hud.gov/topics/housing_choice_voucher_program_sectio
n_8 [https://perma.cc/SQY3-G9QX] (last visited June 1, 2020). 
18. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514. 
19. Id. at 2513. 
20. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 319–21, 329. 
21. Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and Private Power 
to Advance Fair Housing, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1191, 1213 n.106 
(2011); see also Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, HUD: Off. of Pol’y 
Dev. & Res., https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc.html 
[https://perma.cc/SQJ9-E7YG] (last updated May 24, 2019) (The program 
provides “nearly $8 billion in annual budget authority to issue tax credits 
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Internal Revenue Service awards tax credits to states; LIHTC then 
permits states or other designated government entities to distribute tax 
credits to developers. States are required to first develop a plan, listing 
criteria that they must reference to make decisions about how to 
allocate tax credits to developers.22 The allocation of credits impacts 
where low-income housing is sited. Private developers, in turn, can sell 
the credits to financial institutions and other investors in order to raise 
capital to cover the costs of constructing low-income housing, as 
prescribed by federal statute.23 The statute defines a “qualified low-
income housing project” as “any project for residential rental property” 
that satisfies the statutory criteria pertaining to the number of units 
that are “rent-restricted” and occupied by a certain percentage of 
individuals whose incomes fall within the acceptable parameters of the 
“area median gross income.”24 The program has come under fire in 
recent years because, while it has resulted in substantial profits for 
developers and banks, it has not sufficiently produced low-income 
housing in geographically and economically diverse areas,25 nor have 
blacks and Latinos been able to equally access LIHTC housing produced 
in low-poverty areas.26 The Texas Department of Housing administers 
its plan according to points it awards based upon criteria the 
development project satisfies.27 
 
for the acquisition, rehabilitation, or new construction of rental housing 
targeted to lower-income households”). 
22. This is the Qualified Allocation Plan requirement. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m) (2012). 
23. Id. § 42(g)(1);  
24. 26 U.S.C. §42(g)(1). 
25. Patrice Taddonio, In America’s Affordable Housing Crisis, More Demand 
but Less Supply, Frontline (May 9, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
 frontline/article/in-americas-affordable-housing-crisis-more-demand-but-
less-supply/ [https://perma.cc/UC6D-NUL6]. See Poverty, Profit, and 
Politics, (PBS: Frontline television broadcast May 9, 2017), available at 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/poverty-politics-and-profit/ 
[https://perma.cc/XJY3-YJ8]. 
26. Often when affordable housing is constructed, the federal Section 8 
voucher system, along with the imposition of additional requirements, 
inhibits or altogether precludes racial minorities, such as African 
Americans, from taking full advantage of the housing. While it is true 
that LIHTC has been successful in increasing the supply of affordable 
units, with respect to the FHA’s goal of achieving racially- integrated 
housing and neighborhoods, LIHTC has not made an impactful difference. 
See id. See also, Will Fischer, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY 
PRIORITIES, LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT COULD DO MORE TO 
EXPAND OPPORTUNITY FOR POOR FAMILIES, 1- 14 (2018), 4.  
27. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2306.6710(b) (West 2019); see also Reply Brief for 
Petitioners at 4–5, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. 
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 13-1371). 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020 
The Pieces of Housing Integration 
723 
In the underlying case, Inclusive Communities argued that the 
Texas Department of Housing’s practices resulted in more low-income 
housing being built in urban areas heavily populated by blacks in 
comparison to geographic areas primarily populated by whites.28 
Inclusive Communities maintained that the relatively limited number 
of tax credit-sponsored affordable housing projects constructed in the 
suburbs signaled a violation of the FHA: 
TDHCA’s selection and allocation of LIHTC units in the City of 
Dallas was the functional equivalent of intentional racial 
segregation. Whether there was deliberate racial bias or not, 
TDHCA achieved the same segregated result as if there had been 
an explicit decision to engage in racial segregation. TDHCA has 
not just perpetuated but exacerbated the exact discriminatory 
effects of racial segregation that Congress passed the FHA to 
remedy.29  
According to statistical evidence, “state wide TDHCA approved 
49.7% of family units in 90% or greater minority census tracts.”30 In 
contrast, “TDHCA approved 37.4% of all family units in 90% or greater 
[w]hite tracts.”31 Inclusive Communities further noted that, “even when 
units were approved in [w]hite areas, it was for locations where the 
likely tenants were also more likely to be [w]hite.”32 Additionally, the 
data submitted to the district court revealed that, “92.29% of LIHTC 
units in the city of Dallas were located in census tracts with less than 
50% Caucasian residents.”33 Inclusive Communities maintained that, 
not only did African Americans suffer disparate harm as a result of 
TDHCA’s actions, but that the company itself was also negatively 
impacted in its ability to effectively perform its housing-placement and 
neighborhood-racial-integration missions.34 
 
28. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514. 
29. Brief for Respondent at 17–18, Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) 
(No. 13-1371) (citation omitted). 
30. Id. at 24. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514 (quoting Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 
Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 749 F. Supp. 2d 486, 499 (N.D. 
Tex. 2010); see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 24. 
34. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514. At the district court, the specific 
harm Inclusive Communities alleged it suffered concerned difficulties it 
experienced in placing Section 8 voucher tenants: 
 To establish causation, [Inclusive Communities] presents evidence that 
TDHCA disproportionately denies tax credits to proposed developments 
in Caucasian neighborhoods, making it more difficult for [Inclusive 
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The plaintiff framed its case in terms of the FHA, alleging that 
TDHCA’s practices violated sections 804(a)35 and 805(a)36 and 
interfered overall with the Act’s integrative objectives.37 Relying upon 
a disparate-impact theory,38 Inclusive Communities argued that even 
though there may not be direct evidence showing that TDHCA made 
solely race-conscious decisions in distributing housing credits, its 
practices in administering the program worked to racially divide 
communities and concentrate low-income housing in small geographic 
areas rather than evenly disperse units throughout Dallas and its 
suburbs.39  
The Supreme Court decided the question of whether disparate 
impact claims may be brought under the Fair Housing Act.40 In a 5–4 
decision, the Court held that disparate-impact liability is within the 
FHA’s scope;41 not only are such claims cognizable, but they are 
 
Communities] to find Section 8-participating housing in those areas. 
Because TDHCA is the sole entity with authority to award tax credits to 
developers, its decisions directly affect the availability and geographical 
distribution of low-income housing. 
 Inclusive Cmtys., 749 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (footnote omitted). Persuaded 
by this evidence, the district court held that Inclusive Communities had 
established causation. Id. at 497. 
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012) (making it unlawful “to refuse to sell or rent 
after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale 
or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any 
person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin”) 
(emphasis added). 
36. See id. § 3605(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity 
whose business includes engaging in real estate-related transactions to 
discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction, 
or in terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, 
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.”) (emphasis added). 
37. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514. It should be noted that at the 
district-court level, Inclusive Communities also alleged that TDHCA 
engaged in intentional discrimination that violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1984 (2012). Inclusive Cmtys., 
749 F. Supp. 2d at 491. 
38. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2513. 
39. Id. at 2514. 
40. Id. at 2513. 
41. Specifically, the Court held that “disparate-impact claims are cognizable 
under the Fair Housing Act upon considering its results-oriented language, 
the Court’s interpretation of similar language in Title VII and the ADEA, 
Congress’ ratification of disparate-impact claims in 1988 against the 
backdrop of the unanimous view of nine Courts of Appeals, and the 
statutory purpose.” Id. at 2525. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority 
opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Breyer. Id. 
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“consistent with the FHA’s central purpose”42 of eliminating 
discrimination in real-estate and housing transactions. The Court did 
not reach a decision with respect to the underlying dispute concerning 
whether TDHCA’s distribution of housing tax credits to developers 
either resulted in a disparate impact on African-American residents or 
violated the Fair Housing Act.43 Instead, the Court focused on outlining 
the proper approach for reviewing an FHA disparate-impact case and 
remanded the matter so that the lower court could apply the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) burden-
shifting framework to this FHA disparate-impact claim.44 
Although civil-rights advocates cautiously hailed Inclusive 
Communities as a cause for celebration because of the potential for 
disparate-impact claims to remedy racially harmful patterns and 
practices, the Court’s holding is still concerning: it constrained how 
disparate-impact theory can be used in FHA complaints while 
expanding what counts as a defense to such claims.  It is also worth 
noting that, given that nine courts of appeals had previously concluded 
that intent was not a requirement to establish an FHA claim, the 
decision is not as surprising as it initially appears, notwithstanding the 
Court’s ideologically conservative composition.45 
Moving Toward Integration’s authors express optimism that 
disparate-impact theory may be a useful mechanism for accomplishing 
integration in the future.46 While I share their appreciation of disparate-
impact theory’s potential, I note the problematic double-sided nature 
of the Inclusive Communities decision. The case presents itself as a 
supportive precedent for antidiscrimination litigants, but in fact 
operates to further narrow the power of disparate-impact liability as a 
means of achieving racial integration under the FHA. After Inclusive 
Communities, it is clear that although plaintiffs can bring FHA 
disparate-impact claims, such claims are extremely likely to fail. To 
understand why, it is necessary to examine the Court’s instructions for 
how FHA disparate impact-claims should be evaluated. 
 
 
at 2512. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Scalia 
dissented. Id. 
42. Id. at 2521. 
43. See id. at 2513. 
44. Id. at 2525–26; see also Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s 
Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013). 
45. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2519, 2525 (“In light of the longstanding 
judicial interpretation of the FHA to encompass disparate-impact claims 
and congressional reaffirmation of that result, residents and policymakers 
have come to rely on the availability of disparate-impact claims.”). 
46. See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 233–50, 423–44. 
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1. Referencing ADEA and Title VII as Precedents to Determine the 
Viability of the Disparate Impact Claim and Its Parameters 
a. Relevance of the ADEA and Title VII to Both the Court’s Inclusive 
Communities Decision and Disparate-Impact Analysis 
Two anti-employment-discrimination statutes figured prominently 
in the Court’s reasoning in Inclusive Communities, and both are 
germane to the elaboration of my critique. The first statute was section 
703(a) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.47 The second was 
Section 4(a) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.48 
While these statutes were relevant to the Court’s quest to find 
precedent for its ultimate holding—that disparate-impact claims may 
be brought under the FHA49—the Court went too far in its 
interpretation of their relevance for purposes of identifying restraints 
on the application of disparate-impact theory. 
The Court referenced the ADEA in connection with examining its 
plurality decision in Smith v. City of Jackson.50 In Smith, the Court 
interpreted the “otherwise adversely affect” language of Section 4(a)(2) 
of the ADEA51 to mean that, regardless of an employer’s expressed or 
unexpressed intentions or motivations, it may be liable where its actions 
and policies (with respect to age) have a disproportionate negative 
effect on employees (or potential employees). The Inclusive 
Communities Court compared the “otherwise adversely affect” 
language of Title VII and the ADEA, and determined that the phrase 
was “equivalent in function and purpose to the FHA’s ‘otherwise make 
unavailable’ language.”52 
Referencing Griggs v. Duke Power,53 the Court identified other 
supportive statutory language and concluded that intent was not a 
 
47. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2516. 
48. Id. at 2517.  
49. Id. at 2518 (“Together, Griggs holds and the plurality in Smith instructs 
that antidiscrimination laws must be construed to encompass disparate-
impact claims when their text refers to the consequences of action and 
not just to the mindset of actors, and where that interpretation is 
consistent with statutory purpose.”). 
50. 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to 
limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because of such 
individual’s age.”). 
52. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2519. 
53. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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requisite element of liability under the FHA.54 Based upon the 
similarities in language and objectives, and the interpretation of Title 
VII in Griggs,55 the Court reasoned that, just as disparate-impact claims 
are allowed under the ADEA and Title VII, they are contemplated by 
the FHA.56 The FHA, like those other statutes, “was enacted to 
eradicate discriminatory practices within a sector of our Nation’s 
economy.”57 
The Court’s reliance upon the ADEA and Title VII yielded a 
positive result with respect to recognizing the legal viability of FHA 
disparate-impact cases. The damaging aspect of the Court’s analysis 
emerges with the restrictive frame it imposes on this type of claim. 
b. The Inappropriateness of Employment-Discrimination Law 
as a Model for Fair Housing Claims 
Having established the precedential value of the Court’s readings 
of the ADEA and Title VII to its interpretation of the FHA, the Court 
then further considered Smith v. City of Jackson and the Title VII 
disparate-impact cases of Griggs and Ricci v. DeStefano58 to identify 
limitations that courts should impose when evaluating cases relying 
upon disparate-impact theory.59 It is in this part of its reasoning that 
the Court took steps to substantially weaken the power of disparate-
impact claims. The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development’s new 
guidelines60 to interpret the FHA furnished additional grounds to 
essentially disarm disparate-impact cases. Take, for instance, the 
business-necessity defense.61 The defense grants employers substantial 
latitude to justify their actions, even when those actions have 
discriminatory effects. In entertaining the defense, courts are deferential 
to employers because they see employers as being better positioned to 
make decisions about what is necessary for their profitability and the 
smooth functioning of their businesses. The Court concluded that the 
same rationale for the business-necessity defense in employment-
discrimination cases also offers reasonable parameters for limiting 
 
54. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2518. 
55. Id. at 2518–19. 
56. Id. at 2518. 
57. Id. at 2521 (citations omitted). 
58. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). Griggs and Ricci are employment-discrimination 
decisions. Thus, their paradigmatic value for FHA disparate impact claims 
is limited. 
59. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2517–18, 2522–23. 
60. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013). 
61. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522. 
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disparate-impact liability under the FHA.62 It reasoned that the 
employment cases “teach that disparate-impact liability must be 
limited so employers and other regulated entities are able to make the 
practical business choices and profit-related decisions that sustain a 
vibrant and dynamic free-enterprise system.”63  
The Court’s analysis is faulty in several respects. When the Court 
referenced the business-necessity defense, it cast housing-entity 
decision-makers and private developers as employers, even though the 
analogy does not fit in the FHA context. The reasoning the Court offers 
for resorting to this paradigm is seriously impoverished:  
Just as an employer may maintain a workplace requirement that 
causes a disparate impact if that requirement is a ‘reasonable 
measure[ment] of job performance,’ so too must housing 
authorities and private developers be allowed to maintain a policy 
if they can prove it is necessary to achieve a valid interest.64  
This conclusion is not logically sound. It does not follow that housing 
authorities and developers should escape further scrutiny simply 
because they can state a valid interest, particularly when their practices 
cause a racially discriminatory harm. 
The practices that Inclusive Communities challenged were not 
those taken by employers with respect to employees; the decisions 
concerned the development and placement of affordable housing. The 
Texas Department of Housing’s role as employer was not being called 
into question per se. That is, Inclusive Communities’ lawsuit recognized 
that when the department makes decisions about LIHTC it is not 
simply a hiring decision. Rather, the decisions pertain to locating 
appropriate sites for low-income housing, the application of criteria for 
project selection, and the selection of developers to partner with to 
build the housing. Thus, the employer–employee paradigm is 
inappropriate. Instead, the relevant inquiries are whether housing 
agencies and public servants are performing their duties to the public, 
and whether they are pursuing the integration goals of the FHA in 
maintaining adherence to fair-housing laws.65 Similarly, to the extent 
 
62. Id. at 2518. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 2523 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971)). 
65. The FHA emerged out of the government’s recognition that an 
“integrated society” was needed to respond to “the explosive 
concentration of Negroes in urban ghettoes.” Brief for Constitutional 
Accountability Center as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3–4, 
Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017) (Nos. 15-
1111, 15-1112) (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. S3422 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968) 
(statement of Sen. Mondale), and 114 Cong. Rec. H9589 (daily ed. Apr. 
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that private developers partner with public entities, courts’ analyses 
should concentrate on whether developers demonstrated the requisite 
public concern when proposing, advocating, and completing low-income 
housing projects. The relevant questions include whether the projects 
were sufficiently diversified along racial and geographic lines. Despite 
the inappropriateness of the employer–employee lens for analyzing 
discriminatory practices in housing, the Court drew upon the logic of 
the former to impose a straitjacket on FHA disparate-impact-liability 
plaintiffs. 
Texas’s LIHTC program was under scrutiny in Inclusive 
Communities.66 That program’s primary objective is to increase low-
income housing. The state and local administrators of the program must 
accomplish that objective in conformity with the FHA. It is not an 
either–or endeavor. That is, unlike situations involving businesses, 
profit is not the driving motivation. While profit is usually the sine qua 
non of companies, this is not necessarily the case when they are enlisted 
to fulfill public goals, as they are with LIHTC programs; in those 
situations, they are subject to other requirements. Thus, it is improper 
for courts to adopt a hands-off policy when they scrutinize how 
government entities perform their duties in connection with furthering 
the FHA’s objectives. Where racial discrimination is alleged, the 
agency’s selection of low-income housing sites and developers, the 
weighing of the criteria for the administration of the LIHTC, and the 
diversity of development proposals should all be subject to strict 
scrutiny. 
The Court, contrary to the FHA’s mandate to diminish housing 
discrimination through integration efforts, elevated the business 
justifications it predicted government entities and developers would 
likely offer to defend their site and project selections for low-income 
housing. From the Court’s lens, “market factors,” such as “cost and 
traffic patterns . . . preserving historic architecture,”67 and “compliance 
with health and safety codes”68 are all potentially acceptable reasons 
 
10, 1968) (statement of Rep. Ryan)); see also Nat’l Advisory Comm’n 
on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission 
on Civil Disorders 8 (1968). 
66. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2513. There are other government 
affordable-housing programs. See Daria Daniel, Affordable Housing 
Federal Programs and Legislation, Nat’l Ass’n of Counties (May 14, 
2018), https://www.naco.org/articles/affordable-housing-federal-programs-
and-legislation [https://perma.cc/8TRT-TFZP] (listing other such programs). 
67. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523. 
68. Id. at 2524. The Court concluded that if “housing authorities and private 
developers” can “prove” that their practices are “necessary to achieve a 
valid interest,” they “must” be permitted to keep such practices in place. 
Id. at 2523. 
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that would insulate these housing-market actors from FHA disparate-
impact liability. In articulating the list of exculpatory factors, the Court 
expressed its concern over “a community’s quality of life,”69 but it did 
not demonstrate the same concern towards the communities who are 
subjected to more than their “fair share” of low-income housing.70 
Moreover, the Court’s logic loses sight of the FHA’s anti-discriminatory 
purposes. The involvement of other intervening actors and events in 
the decision-making process should not disqualify the governmental 
housing agency (in this instance, the TDHCA) from being recognized 
as the entity that caused the discriminatory harm.  
2. The Burden Shifting Framework 
HUD imposed a new analytical construct for the evaluation of FHA 
disparate-impact claims.71 The burden-shifting framework, in the 
housing context, lacks historical foundation. Stacey Seicshnaydre has 
observed that “none of the judicially created, burden shifting methods 
of proof generated over the history of Title VII and Title VIII can be 
found in the text of the FHA.”72 The cumbersome framework 
significantly enhances the burden on disparate impact plaintiffs: 
(1) The plaintiff “has the burden of proving that a challenged 
practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory 
effect”;73 
(2) Once a plaintiff makes a prima-facie showing of disparate 
impact, “the burden shifts to the defendant to ‘prov[e] that the 
 
69. Id. 
70. Here, I am borrowing the term “fair share” from the Mount Laurel cases 
which imposed the requirement on New Jersey communities to accept 
their fair share of affordable housing. See South Burlington Cty. NAACP 
v. Mount Laurel Township, 336 A.2d 713, 743–44 (N.J. 1975); South 
Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Township, 456 A.2d 390, 411 
(N.J. 1983); Hills Dev. Co. v. Somerset, 510 A.2d 621, 631 (N.J. 1986). 
 Sander, Kucheva, and Zasloff also engage in a productive examination of 
the Mount Laurel cases. See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 239–43.  
71. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013). 
72. Stacey E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An 
Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Claims Under the Fair 
Housing Act, 63 Am. U. L. Rev. 357, 410 (2013). 
73. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514 (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) 
(2014)). 
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challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more 
substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests’”;74 and 
(3) If the defendant meets the requirements of step 2, then the 
“plaintiff may ‘prevail upon proving that the substantial, 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged 
practice could be served by another practice that has a less 
discriminatory effect.’”75  
Not only is HUD’s imposition of the foregoing scheme problematic 
from the standpoint of vigilant enforcement of the FHA, but the Court’s 
recommendations concerning the requisite kind of proof and its 
suggestions for evaluating the proof reveal how the Inclusive 
Communities holding, when taken in its entirety, is detrimental to FHA 
plaintiffs. The Court offered the following supplementary instructions 
in connection with remanding the case.76 
a. Establishing a causal connection 
Establishing a causal link between the defendants’ actions and the 
harm claimed is the initial hurdle that plaintiffs must overcome.77 The 
Court advised that “[a] plaintiff who fails to allege facts at the pleading 
stage or produce statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection 
cannot make out a prima facie case of disparate impact.”78 A fair 
reading of the Court’s formulation is that it requires a plaintiff to 
establish his claim before being granted a trial on the entirety of his 
case. The Court’s approach forecloses opportunities to elicit evidence in 
the context of a full hearing. Prior to having the benefit of an extensive 
due-diligence investigation or being able to evaluate the defendant’s 
evidence and subject it to the rigors of interrogation, the Court 
essentially requires the plaintiff to prove its case—that is, the plaintiff 
must establish that the reason for the alleged racial disparity is an 
isolated government action (policy, practice, or law). Interestingly, as 
discussed below, the plaintiff cannot successfully assert that the racial 
disparity is due to the failure of the government to take action.79  
 
74. Id. at 2514–15 (alteration in original) (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) 
(2014)). 
75. Id. at 2515 (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3) (2014)). 
76. Id. The district court improperly placed the burden on the defendant to 
devise alternatives rather than on plaintiff. Id. 
77. 24 C.F.R. §100.500(c)(1) (2014).  
78. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523. 
79. See id. (pointing out that a plaintiff fails to make a prima facie disparate-
impact case if she does not allege facts at the pleading stage demonstrating 
a causal connection between the governmental action and the disparate 
impact). 
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The Court outlines the contours of the causal requirement that a 
disparate-impact plaintiff must satisfy without providing the substance 
of what the requirement entails. Instead of constructing a fairly lenient 
standard that would permit the plaintiff to present some facts 
supporting a claim that the government’s practice has a racially 
harmful impact in tension with the FHA, the Court engages in a lengthy 
discussion that achieves little more than emphasizing the impossibility 
of satisfying the causation requirement for cases of this type. In the 
end, rather than articulate a precise standard, the Court leaves open 
the question of what constitutes a sufficient nexus between government 
action and harmful racial effects to establish a prima facie case.  What 
is clear is that courts must subject any prima facie evidence submitted 
by plaintiffs to rigorous scrutiny; further, this evidence must do more 
than establish a racial disparity.80 Even if a plaintiff is able to furnish 
evidence connecting housing racial disparities to governmental actions, 
such evidence will be heavily discounted. This is clear from the Court’s 
statements which essentially inoculate agencies, like TDHCA, from 
disparate impact liability where “federal law substantially inhibits [the 
agencies’] discretion.”81 The Court offers federal involvement, via 
regulations and rules, as an appropriate limit on liability without 
considering the actual impact of that involvement on state and local 
agencies, as they make LIHTC siting decisions. Federal requirements 
have more latitude than the Court suggests. Disparate impact analysis, 
properly applied, should allow for figuring out the effects resulting from 
the application of relevant criteria, embedded in rules and laws, and 
should allow for identifying legal solutions that have less discriminatory 
effects.  
  The Inclusive Communities Court configured the causation 
requirement in a manner that is unduly onerous on plaintiffs. The 
approach affords decision-makers substantial deference while 
undercutting the evidence plaintiffs are likely to offer. The framework 
is counter to the very systemic operations that disparate-impact 
liability is designed to apprehend. In other words, it overlooks the 
structures that work to create discriminatory impacts. Other than 
pointing to the authority (i.e., the exercise of discretion) of the 
designated agency to make the final decisions regarding placement of 
housing, it is impossible to isolate a singular practice that violated the 
FHA. Instead, it is the culmination of practices—the selection of the 
criteria, the priority given to some requirements over others, the 
willingness to entertain community resistance (“NIMBY”-ism)— 
cohering in the decision-making body that creates the problem. Rather 
than appreciating that the governmental decision-making process is 
 
80. Id. at 2523. 
81. Id. at 2523–2524. 
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interlinked with others, in that it prevails upon subordinate entities and 
agents, the Court concludes that if the plaintiff cannot isolate a policy 
or practice in connection with the statistical evidence, then his 
disparate impact claim must fail.82 
The Court’s perspective fails to appreciate that decision-making 
authority is ultimately resolved in one entity to determine which 
LIHTC projects will be funded and where they will be located. Here, 
the ultimate decider for administering the LIHTC program, as 
designated by state statute, is the Texas Department of Housing.83 
Courts should not be permitted to disregard the department’s 
statutorily conferred role and replace it with a characterization of the 
Texas LIHTC program’s decision-making process that insulates the 
designated decider from liability. Furthermore, the federal 
government’s involvement in levying requirements on the state and 
local administration of such programs does not negate the TDHCA’s 
actions in rendering decisions regarding low-income housing 
placement.84 As the Court itself observed, neither the FHA85 nor other 
federally imposed criteria mandate that low-income housing always be 
placed in overcrowded urban centers. The TDHCA has discretion 
regarding the approval of sites; it could exercise its discretion to give a 
greenlight to affordable housing in the suburbs and in other parts of 
the municipality to which racially diverse low-income populations seek 
access.  
 The Court fetishizes the notion of singularity, making the 
identification of a sole action a requirement for establishing a prima 
facie case.86 For example, the Court reasoned: 
 
[A] plaintiff challenging the decision of a private developer to 
construct a new building in one location rather than another will 
not easily be able to show this is a policy causing disparate impact 
because such a one-time decision may not be a policy at all. It may 
also be difficult to establish causation because of the multiple 
 
82. Id. at 2523 (“[A] disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical 
disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant policy or 
policies causing that disparity.”). 
83. 10 Tex. Admin. Code § 11.1 (2019); see also Brief for Respondent, supra 
note 29, at 37 (“TDHCA was the only agency in the state that could 
allocate LIHTC.”). 
84. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524 (“[I]f [Inclusive Communities] cannot 
show a causal connection between the Department’s policy and a 
disparate impact—for instance, because federal law substantially limits 
the Department’s discretion that should result in dismissal of this case.”).  
85. Id. at 2523. 
86. Id. at 2514. 
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factors that go into investment decisions about where to construct 
or renovate housing units.87 
 
The Court imposes the requirement of exact precision with respect 
to identifying a singular cause and measuring its harm.88 Disparate-
impact theory, however, distills patterns. Where there are disturbing 
correlations between government action and race that result in a denial 
of federal constitutional rights, (e.g., protection from racially 
discriminatory treatment in procuring housing), disparate-impact 
theory facilitates the flagging of occurrences and outcomes and compels 
courts to inquire further into the sources responsible for engendering 
the conditions that perpetuate inequality. While it is important, for 
reasons of fairness and rigorous judicial inquiry, that the analysis does 
not end with highlighting a racial disparity, it is imperative that the 
Court does not construct the rubric for testing such claims in a manner 
that ensures their defeat. Contrary to the Court’s view, the fact that 
there are differing components that contribute to a decision should not 
mandate the preclusion of plaintiff’s disparate-impact claim.89 When 
statistical racial disparities are caused by a series of practices or policies 
that cohere in an entity’s decisions, and that entity is imbued with 
ultimate decision-making authority, disparate-impact liability should 
be triggered (i.e., the prima facie threshold is met). 
On remand,90 the District Court for the Northern District of Texas 
adopted a substantially different posture towards Inclusive 
Communities’ case from when it was first presented with the facts.91 It 
opted to re-evaluate whether Inclusive Communities satisfied the first 
prong of the burden-shifting framework—the causation requirement—
which proved to be the plaintiff’s  undoing.92 Subjecting the plaintiff to 
 
87. Id. at 2523–24. 
88. Id. 
89. The Court warns that if “a statistical discrepancy is caused by factors 
other than the defendant’s policy, a plaintiff cannot establish a prima 
facie case, and there is no liability.” Id. 
90. The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit. See 
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2526. A Fifth Circuit panel then remanded 
the case to the district court. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t 
of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 795 F.3d 509, 510 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
91. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 
No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 WL 4494322, *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016). In 
a prior decision, the court granted partial summary judgment in favor of 
Inclusive Communities, ruling that “[it] had established a prima facie case 
on its disparate impact claim.” Id. at *3. 
92. Inclusive Cmtys., No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 WL 4494322, at *10 (N.D. 
Tex. Aug. 26, 2016) (“[Inclusive Communities] has not satisfied the robust 
causality requirement.”). 
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what the Supreme Court had characterized as a “robust causality 
requirement,”93 the court found Inclusive Communities’ evidence of 
disparate-impact discrimination lacking.94 In articulating the plaintiff’s 
duty, the district court stated that Inclusive Communities “must 
affirmatively identify a specific policy that produced a disparate impact 
rather than point to a lack of policy that caused it.”95 Thus, the district 
court inquired about “whether TDHCA’s exercise of discretion in 
deciding how to allocate 9% tax credits is a specific, facially neutral 
policy sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact 
liability.”96  
Based on its analysis of the foregoing, the district court dismissed 
the case,97 concluding that the decisions to place low-income housing in 
certain neighborhoods and to choose sites in minority-populated areas 
rather than predominantly Caucasian-populated areas (which were 
signified by the awarding of tax credits) did not constitute a “specific 
practice that caused the disparity in the location of low-income 
housing.”98 Inclusive Communities could not show that Texas, in 
making decisions about how tax credits were distributed, caused a 
discriminatory impact that was detrimental to African Americans.99 
 
b. Prongs Two and Three of the Burden-Shifting Framework 
There are also significant problems with the Court’s interpretation 
of prongs two and three of the burden-shifting framework. Assuming 
that a plaintiff is able to survive the first level, in the second phase, the 
government is permitted to proffer legitimate rationales to refute the 
allegations of discrimination. The business-justification defenses 
discussed in the previous section are relevant here. The Court went 
further in offering recommendations for how to evaluate the proffered 
reasons in relationship to the plaintiff’s claim of disparate impact 
discrimination, commenting that, “on remand, [the plaintiff’s case] may 
 
93. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523. 
94. Inclusive Cmtys., No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 WL 4494322, at *6. 
95. Id. In addition to drawing upon the Supreme Court’s decision, the court 
looked to Fifth Circuit Judge Jones’s concurring opinion as a blueprint 
for analyzing the plaintiff’s claim. Id. at *5. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at *13. 
98. Id. at *6. Inclusive Communities argued that the governmental decisions 
of site selection, zoning laws, and tenant selection harm low-income 
minorities in that they “exclude” them “from predominantly nonminority 
areas—cities, towns, neighborhoods or specific portions of apartment 
complexes.” Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 36. 
99. Inclusive Cmtys., No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 WL 4494322, at *6. 
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be seen simply as an attempt to second-guess which of two reasonable 
approaches a housing authority should follow in the sound exercise of 
its discretion in allocating tax credits for low-income housing.”100 
Missing from the Court’s reasoning is an anchor from which to evaluate 
what is reasonable. The Court does not carve out space for the FHA’s 
purpose or for the realization of the FHA’s goals. The impetus for 
bringing a lawsuit of this type is to challenge the government’s conduct 
in housing-development schemes and in its administration of housing 
laws and policies. It is appropriate, therefore, for plaintiffs to question 
those practices when they permit an intolerable racially disparate effect. 
There is a grander constitutionally informed template according to 
which courts should evaluate the government’s responses and plaintiff’s 
claims, notwithstanding the Court’s assertion that “[t]he FHA does not 
decree a particular vision of urban development.”101 Contrary to the 
Supreme Court’s assertion that the “FHA is not an instrument to force 
housing authorities to reorder their priorities,”102 the FHA is intended 
to accomplish exactly that in the name of racial equality. The FHA 
promotes and prioritizes desegregation and integration as fundamental 
goals.103 It is inspired by the Kerner Commission’s recommendation 
urging the country to change its troubling trajectory of “moving 
towards two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”104 
Congress adopted the FHA shortly following the assassination of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. on April 4, 1968,105 and on the heels of the 
Kerner Commission’s damning report.106 The Court’s misapprehension 
of the work that the FHA was intended to perform with respect to 
eliminating racial disparities in housing is evident: 
Difficult questions might arise if disparate-impact liability under 
the FHA caused race to be used and considered in a pervasive 
and explicit manner to justify governmental or private actions 
that, in fact, tend to perpetuate race-based considerations rather 
than move beyond them. Courts should avoid interpreting 
disparate-impact liability to be so expansive as to inject racial 
considerations into every housing decision.107  
 
100. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015). 
101. Id. at 2523. 
102. Id. at 2522. 
103. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012). See Trafficante v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 
205, 211 (1972). 
104. Nat’l Advisory Comm’n on Civil Disorders, supra note 65, at 1. 
105. Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 2. 
106. Exec. Order No. 11,365, 3 C.F.R. § 647 (1966–1970). 
107. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524. 
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Plaintiffs will assert that certain housing policies have led to racial 
disparities. Their claims will necessitate that courts consider matters of 
race in order to properly address those claims. But the Court’s language 
here seeks to foreclose that process by expressing anxiety that it cannot 
judicially perform this task, and that such claims in themselves are 
improper. The claims already reference race. Therefore, courts will need 
to take race into consideration to analyze the cases presented.  
With respect to the third prong, the burden is unfairly placed on 
plaintiffs to devise alternatives to the challenged practice. Decisions like 
Inclusive Communities (and its resolution on remand) make it more 
difficult for plaintiffs to draw upon anti-discrimination tools, such as 
the FHA, to shape government policies and practices for the purpose of 
attaining equality in housing, achieving racial integration, and 
improving the access of low-income racial minorities to communities 
that are socio-economically, racially, and geographically diverse. 
Inclusive Communities is exemplary of the multi-faceted problems 
emerging from missed opportunities related to the FHA. 
B. Developers 
Inclusive Communities also raises an issue with respect to 
developers and the role they play in both facilitating racial integration 
in housing and constructing affordable housing. Developers are 
substantial contributors to the problem in terms of the proposals they 
submit for the siting of residences. If they fail to present geographically 
diverse projects, and they are not incentivized or mandated to do so by 
government agencies, then the construction of affordable housing is 
relegated to the usual sectors (i.e., overcrowded urban cores, 
impoverished suburbs, isolated and economically-challenged ex-urbs). 
In a true public–private partnership, it is appropriate to ask developers 
to perform in certain ways or to satisfy particular objectives in 
conjunction with being granted the privilege of constructing multi-
family affordable housing. On this point, I am at odds with Moving 
Toward Integration’s authors, who characterize the imposition of 
certain requirements on developers undertaking this type of 
development as “inefficient” and as impediments to getting the projects 
built.108 Depending on what the requirements are, and assuming that 
they do not cross into impermissible-exactions territory, the time to 
engage in negotiating the construction deal is at the beginning of the 
planning process. Cities should seek the best deals for their residents 
and work to  equitably disperse the benefits. If anything, cities often do 
not ask for enough on behalf of their constituents.109 There is ample 
 
108. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 440. 
109. Too often city officials enter into imprudent contracts with vendors and 
other corporate entities without fully accounting for the ramifications of 
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evidence documenting the substantial gains developers realize in 
association with the LIHTC projects.110 As long as developers can make 
a sufficient level of profit to motivate them to construct affordable 
housing, they will do so. 
C. Mobility Grants and Their Relationship to Inclusive Communities  
One of the strategies that Moving Toward Integration recommends 
is the distribution of mobility grants in accordance with certain 
criteria.111 There is much that I like about this proposal. It restores 
agency to renters and homebuyers by empowering them to make 
racially integrating housing decisions. The proposal seeks to avoid some 
of the problematic bureaucratic, middle-person issues that arose in 
Inclusive Communities regarding governmental administration of the 
LIHTC and the resistance of white suburbs to having low-income 
housing constructed in their areas. Mobility grants would subsidize 
movers though a reduced interest rate or housing-allowance awards.112  
My caution is that it would be necessary to monitor the distribution 
of the mobility grants, as well as the results. It is necessary to ensure 
that they, in fact, operate in both directions—allowing for blacks to 
integrate white areas and whites to integrate black areas—not just in 
the latter direction, subsidizing whites gentrifying areas populated by 
blacks and, ultimately, displacing them by driving up costs. Where 
individuals and agencies are involved, Inclusive Communities teaches 
that there is always the possibility for disparities in program 
implementation.113 Just as the Texas Department of Housing was 
criticized for failing to administer the LIHTC in a way to foster racial 
integration, there is a risk that the structures (i.e., courts, institutions, 
agents, and decision-makers) responsible for the administration of the 
mobility grants may not adhere to the purposes and objectives of plan. 
I note that Moving Toward Integration is sensitive to this latter 
possibility and recognizes the need to guard against it.114 
 
the deal. The assets may be improperly valued given the market, the 
length of the contract may be too long, etc. 
110. Chris Edwards & Vanessa B. Calder, Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: 
Costly, Complex, and Corruption-Prone, CATO Inst. Tax & Budget 
Bull., Nov. 13, 2017, at 1, 3; Laura Sullivan, Affordable Housing Program 
Costs More, Shelters Fewer, NPR (May 9, 2017), https://www.npr.org/ 
 2017/05/09/527046451/affordable-housing-program-costs-more-shelters-
less [https://perma.cc/8VWM-EWAH]. 
111. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 423–29. 
112. Id. at 425. 
113. I raise this point because the authors envision that a “metropolitan 
council” would be charged with the details of program design. Id. 
114. Id. at 423–24. 
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Inclusive Communities, both at the Supreme Court and on remand, 
illustrates how courts and government can thwart, rather than advance, 
integration objectives. Local government can undermine and subvert 
the good intentions of federal laws and statutes. Individual actions, with 
the assistance of local government, can hinder (or decelerate) well-
intended judicial decisions designed to advance racial integration. 
Buchanan v. Warley,115 Shelley v. Kraemer,116 the Mount Laurel cases,117 
and, in the realm of education, Brown v. Board of Education,118 are 
illustrative of this problem. 119 
IV. Banks: Promises and Problems 
For good reasons, Moving Toward Integration devotes substantial 
attention to banks. Like the book’s authors, I recognize that banks are 
essential to addressing issues of racial integration and housing 
inequality; banks have played an integral part in the financial well-
being of individuals, neighborhoods, and cities. They are extraordinarily 
powerful entities that create and preserve wealth. As lenders, they 
facilitate access to housing. I also agree with the authors that the type 
of banking institution can make a tremendous difference. The authors 
make the important distinction between the megabank, on the order of 
Wells Fargo or Bank of America, and exceptional community banks, 
like the now-defunct South Shore Bank.120 Noting that distinction is 
relevant to my comments on the authors’ fifth strategy of turning to 
 
115. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
116. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
117. See, e.g., Southern Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mount 
Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). For an enlightening discussion of the 
Mount Laurel cases, see Paula A. Franzese et al., Mount Laurel and the 
Fair Housing Act: Success or Failure?, 19 Fordham Urb. L.J. 59 (1991). 
118. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
119. See Derrick Bell, Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of 
Education and The Unfulfilled Hopes For Racial Reform (2005). 
Another example is the lack of compliance with the federal “affirmatively 
furthering fair housing” (“AFFH”) rule. Notwithstanding the legal 
mandate to affirmatively further fair housing, federal agencies, including 
HUD, have not always worked to integrate communities or alter 
segregation patterns. See e.g., NFHA, et al. v. Carson, Civ. Action No. 
1:18-cv-01076, filed May 8, 2018 (the National Fair Housing Alliance and 
others filed suit against HUD alleging that HUD improperly suspended 
“key requirements of the AFFH Rule”), para. 78. 
120. See FDIC Failed Bank Information, FDIC https://www.fdic.gov/bank/ 
 individual/failed/shorebank.html [https://perma.cc/3SNQ-YPXC] (last updated 
Jan. 29, 2019) (“On Friday, August 20, 2010, ShoreBank, Chicago, IL was 
closed by the Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, and 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was named Receiver.”). 
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community development banks to help improve the financial profiles of 
under-served banking populations and promote the asset growth 
necessary for enhancing the likelihood of transitioning to racially-
integrated neighborhoods. The authors propose that “the role of the 
bank would not only be to improve the credit records and access to 
credit for households in segregated communities, but also to assist in 
supervising and guiding the neighborhood initiative.”121 I further agree 
with the authors that a “key problem in inner-city communities 
is . . . the absence of financial institutions engaged in community 
building.”122 I differ from them, however, in their assessment of lending 
practices in the African-American community. The authors suggest that 
the problems experienced are not attributable to an absence of “fair 
lending per se.”123 I disagree. Blacks have faced sustained 
discriminatory, unscrupulous, and predatory-lending practices.124 There 
is substantial scholarship and evidence to support that position.125 I 
disagree with the authors regarding the extent of the damage that 
lending institutions, historically, have caused African-American 
communities, the continued harms that banks (including their agents) 
perpetrate, and the potential for productive future transactional 
relationships that will serve racial integration goals.126 Redlining and 
reverse redlining practices have left indelible marks.127   
 
121. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 434. 
122. Id. at 230. 
123. Id. 
124. Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and 
Inequality in Postwar Detroit (2014); Jonathan Spader et al., 
Fostering Inclusion in American Neighborhoods (2017), available 
at https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/a_shared_future_ 
 fostering_inclusion.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC3J-HSSQ]; Keeanga-
Yamahtta Taylor, Race for Profit: How Banks and the Real 
Estate Industry Undermined Black Homeownership (2019); 
Beryl Satter, Family Properties: Race, Real Estate and the 
Exploitation of Black Urban America (2009). 
125. Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law (2017). 
126. See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 251–68. 
127. Redlining refers to a set of discriminatory loan practices.  Redlining takes 
its name from the maps drawn by the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation 
(HOLC), a federal agency no longer in existence.  At its inception, 
redlining entailed HOLC demarcating various regions of a city, identifying 
those neighborhoods that were deemed creditworthy and those that were 
deemed poor credit risks. The red refers to the coloring indicating the 
designated poor or high risk sections on the maps. Based upon those 
designations, lenders, appraisers, and other officials have made decisions 
regarding mortgage loans and property valuation. Historically, redlining 
has operated to deny African Americans equal access to mortgage loans 
on fair terms. Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law 59–64 (2017). 
Reverse redlining refers to the targeting of specific racial groups for 
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In this section, I reference two examples to reflect on Moving 
Toward Integration’s suggestions concerning banks. 
A. The Racial Surtax: Department of Justice Settlement with Wells Fargo 
Bank, NA  
In 2012, Wells Fargo entered into a $175 million settlement 
agreement with the Department of Justice (DOJ).128 The DOJ had 
alleged that Wells Fargo committed numerous violations of the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair Housing Act.129 The suit alleged, 
among other things, that mortgage brokers affiliated with Wells Fargo 
“steered” minority borrowers into higher priced and riskier loans than 
whites with similar credit profiles.130 According to the government’s 
proposed consent decree, in 2009, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) “determined that it had reason to believe that Wells 
Fargo engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of 
race or color, in violation of the FHA and the EOCA”131: 
 “Specifically, the OCC found that, after controlling for credit 
factors, there was reason to believe that Wells Fargo placed 
African-American applicants in the subprime mortgage lending 
channel in the Washington-Baltimore-Northern Virginia, DC-
MD-VA-WV Combined Statistical Area (“Washington CSA”) 
more frequently than similarly-situated white applicants during 
the period from 2004–2008.”132  
The DOJ also conducted its own investigation into the bank’s practices, 
in May 2009, and found similar disparities.133 
 
predatory lending practices and risky loans, such as subprime mortgages 
with extraordinarily high interest rates or other unfavorable terms.  
128. Charlie Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage Bias Charges, N.Y. 
Times (July 12, 2012). https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/business/ 
 wells-fargo-to-settle-mortgage-discrimination-charges.html [https://perma.cc/ 
 S5MY-4LBX]. 
129. Id. 
130. Id.; Rick Rothacker & David Ingram, Wells Fargo to Pay $175 Million in 




131. Consent Order at 2, United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, Case 1:12-
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The import of the government’s allegations, supporting evidence, 
and resulting settlement agreement should not be overlooked. This 
hefty settlement is a sign of the wide-ranging predatory-lending 
practices that banks engaged in with respect to primarily black and 
Latinos communities. It is also a troubling sign of the dedication of 
some major lending institutions to flouting laws aimed at ensuring 
fairness and equity in loan transactions in order to extract as much 
capital as possible from targeted minority groups.134 An assistant 
attorney general working on the case referred to the differential 
treatment as a “racial surtax.”135 A lingering question remains when 
incorporating banks into the plan for racial diversification of 
neighborhoods: How can the racial surtax be avoided? 
B. Bank of America Corp., et al. v. City of Miami (2017) 
Turning now to Bank of America, Corp., et al. v. City of Miami.136 
This case offers an example of how powerful structuring institutions, 
like banks, can complicate the success of integration and fair-housing 
initiatives. The case also highlights the permissive environment that 
municipalities facilitated for banks. In this insufficiently regulated 
space, banks were able to inflict substantial harm on certain 
neighborhoods in the years leading up to the Great Recession.  
At the Supreme Court, the Miami case involved standing.137 
Specifically, the Court decided whether the City of Miami had standing 
to bring an FHA case against Wells Fargo and Bank of America.138 
Scrutinizing the “aggrieved-person” standard under the FHA, the Court 
 
134. Perhaps, Sander, Kucheva, and Zasloff’s call for more detailed testing—
completing loan application data rather than merely paired testing, 
combined with vigilant enforcement of the FHA and other important laws 
like the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), etc.—will allow for more 
substantial strides to be achieved. See generally Sander et al., supra 
note 1, at 423–66. 
135. Savage, supra note 128. 
136. 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017). The behavior towards minority borrowers that 
Miami alleged was apparently not limited to that city, judging from the 
cases that have been filed in Philadelphia, Oakland, and other cities; it 
appears that banks engaged in these practices in numerous black and 
Latino communities throughout the country. See e.g., City of Philadelphia 
v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. CV 17-2203, 2018 WL 424451, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 16, 2018); Cook County. v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 314 F. Supp. 
3d 950 (N.D. Ill. 2018); City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 
15-CV-04321-EMC, 2018 WL 3008538, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018). 
137. Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1301. 
138. Id. Bank of America was involved by virtue of its acquisition of 
Countrywide Financial. 
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concluded that Miami had standing (under Article III)139 to bring its 
civil claim for monetary damages.140 The Court also recognized that the 
economic harms that Miami asserted were “arguably within the zone of 
interests” targeted by the FHA.141 The Court remanded the case on the 
causation element, holding that in order to prevail, a plaintiff needs to 
do more than assert that its injuries were the “foreseeabl[e]” result of 
the defendant’s alleged statutorily prohibited conduct.142 Instead, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that “the harm alleged has a sufficiently 
close connection to the conduct the statute prohibits.”143 The Court left 
the task of delineating the proper proximate cause and application 
standards to the lower courts.144 
The underlying case concerned the City of Miami’s complaint that 
the banks violated the FHA by “intentionally” engaging in predatory 
banking practices aimed at African-American and Latino neighborhood 
residents,145 such as charging higher interest rates on loans, levying 
unreasonably high fees and penalties, and denying minority borrowers 
opportunities to refinance or modify their loans.146 The city further 
alleged that the banks’ practices: (i) led to higher rates of foreclosure 
for minority borrowers when compared to nonminority borrowers; (ii) 
the behavior disproportionately created pockets of “foreclosures and 
vacancies,” which precipitated “stagnation and decline in African-
American and Latino neighborhoods”;147 and (iii) the conduct brought 
about a decrease in property values in numerous neighborhoods 
populated by these racial groups.148 But what is really interesting about 
this case is that the city is the entity seeking to collect for the harm: 
Miami argued that the harms suffered by black and Latino communities 
were also detrimental to the city itself.149 Specifically, the city 
 
139. In order to satisfy the Article III standing requirement, the plaintiff “must 
show an ‘injury in fact’ that is ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendant’s conduct 
and ‘that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” Id. at 
1302 (quoting Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins, 135 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)). 
140. Id. at 1303. 
141. Id. (“lost tax revenue and extra municipal expenses—satisfy the ‘cause of 
action’ (or ‘prudential standing’) requirement”). 
142. Id. at 1301. 
143. Id. at 1305. 
144. Id. at 1305–06. 
145. Id. at 1304. 
146. Id. at 1301. 
147. Id. at 1304 (quoting Joint Appendix, at 225, 409, Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 
(Nos. 15-1111, 15-1112)). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 1302. 
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maintained that the banks’ practices “adversely impacted the racial 
composition of [Miami]”;150 sabotaged Miami’s goal to accomplish 
“racial integration and desegregation”;151 interfered with Miami’s 
objectives concerning “promoting fair housing and securing the benefits 
of an integrated community”;152 diminished the city’s property tax 
revenues;153 and caused Miami to allocate more money for “municipal 
services . . . to remedy blight and unsafe and dangerous conditions.”154 
This case is significant to my discussion in several respects. It 
highlights the roles of two primary structuring entities—cities and 
banks—in the housing-integration puzzle. It exposes the damage that 
banks can cause when given essentially free reign (meaning 
unregulated) to operate in neighborhoods. Although this a matter of 
conjecture, I propose that the city was unguarded and expansive in 
detailing the alleged harms in a way that it would not have been in 
another context. Imagine, for example, a negotiation between the city 
and African-American and Latino residents concerning the city’s failure 
to utilize all of its protective tools and anti-discrimination mechanisms 
to prevent the decimation of neighborhoods by deleterious lending 
practices. In that context, the city may not have been so candid and 
revealing of the harms caused. 
It is also important to consider the impetus for cases of this type 
and whether the driving factors need to be taken into account when 
proposing solutions to deal with housing segregation. Many cities are 
suffering from fiscal strangulation.155 Not having a deep revenue stream 
to attend to infrastructure and provide public health and safety 
resources is a significant problem. Clearly, many banks have deep 
pockets. They are a logical target for municipalities seeking to 
recuperate lost revenue and to replenish their fiscal reserves. Some 
entity needs to pay; the banks have been enrichened by their actions, 
so, local governments may logically reason, why not seek a share of 
 
150. Id. at 1301 (quoting Joint Appendix at 232, 416, Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 
(Nos. 15-1111, 15-1112)). 
151. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 232, 416, Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (Nos. 15-
1111, 15-1112)). 
152. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 232–33, 416–17, Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 
(Nos. 15-1111, 15-1112)). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 1309 (quoting Joint Appendix at 417, Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (Nos. 
15-1111, 15-1112)). 
155. Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 Yale L.J. 1118, 
1140 (2014); The Fiscal Landscape of Large U.S. Cities: Local 
Governments Still Recovering Long After Great Recession’s End, PEW 
(Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/ 
 issue-briefs/2016/12/the-fiscal-landscape-of-large-us-cities [https://perma.cc/ 
 V53A-A3NN]. 
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their profits? Moving Toward Integration undertakes a probing analysis 
that prompts readers to scrutinize, intensely, whether cities have been 
actively engaged in behaviors and policies to promote integration. In 
their lawsuits, Miami and other cities asserted that their integration 
actions were impeded by banks’ predatory actions. It is worth 
examining these claims in more detail and acquiring information about 
the particular integrative efforts taken. Cities should be prepared to 
identify the specific initiatives underway that were aimed at achieving 
integration.156 They should also be required to report on their progress. 
The Miami case should also prompt cities to re-evaluate their 
public–private relationships with banks and developers. When 
municipalities provide inadequate protections and resources to 
neighborhoods populated by historically marginalized racial minorities, 
it leaves those communities susceptible to exploitative practices. Before 
a crisis unfolds, municipalities should be more proactive about designing 
policies aimed at racially integrating its communities and making them 
economically sound. Alas, on remand, even though the Eleventh Circuit 
held that Miami properly established a connection between the harms 
claimed and the banks’ actions,157 Miami requested that the case be 
dismissed.158  It is unclear whether Miami’s decision was prompted by 
any concessions on the part of the banks.159 Regardless of the 
motivations prompting the dismissal request, the litigation has 
significance. Cases of this type illustrate that the municipality’s welfare 
is interconnected with that of its residents. If cities, like Miami, are able 
to leverage their power, it should be to set guidelines and goals 
regarding business conduct within municipal borders. To the extent 
that future lawsuits in this vein result in favorable settlements or 
 
156. Miami’s claims raise a question of whether the heavily impacted 
neighborhoods that they based the lawsuit on were integrated with black 
and white residents or integrated with black and Latino residents, etc. 
157. The Eleventh Circuit, on remand, constructed a proximate-cause standard 
that litigants could conceivably satisfy. In addition to foreseeability, the 
court observed: “Proximate cause asks whether there is a direct, logical, 
and identifiable connection between the injury sustained and its alleged 
cause. If there is no discontinuity to call into question whether the alleged 
misconduct led to the injury, proximate cause will have been adequately 
pled.” City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 923 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th 
Cir. 2019), cert. granted, vacating as moot 140 S. Ct. 1259 (2020) (mem.). 
In applying that standard, the Eleventh Circuit held that: “the City has 
adequately pled proximate cause when it comes to a tax-base injury 
because the Banks’ redlining and reverse-redlining practices bear some 
direct relation to the City’s fiscal injuries.” Id. at 1294. 
158. City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 923 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir. 2019), 
cert. granted, vacating as moot 140 S. Ct. 1259 (2020) (mem.).  
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favorable court decisions, cities should be required to allocate some of 
the money to help those communities that were harmed in the first 
place; they should not be able to simply pocket the gains. 
V. Community Banks 
I concur with Moving Toward Integration’s authors that because 
banks are salient to solving the segregation–integration puzzle, they are 
worthy of extensive study. Of course, they have been a substantial part 
of the problem, but select banks like the extraordinary exception of 
South Shore Bank, should be studied in detail to extract lessons. The 
book’s chapters detailing the genesis of South Shore Bank and its 
successes are fascinating and well worth extended examination. After 
reading that material, I had two main interrelated questions. The 
authors identify key successful ingredients in the establishment of South 
Shore Bank, but I query whether a South Shore Bank can be replicated 
in today’s times. I also question whether community banks can thrive 
in this economic and political climate. 
VI. The Will of the Public 
It is not my intention to evaluate the soundness of the empirical 
models that appear throughout Moving Toward Integration, but rather 
to interrogate some of the assumptions the authors make. They 
underestimate the resistance to integration exhibited by white 
communities. Some of their claims about white flight are undercut by 
the details. Drawing heavily upon the scholarship of Ingrid Gould Ellen 
in reaching certain conclusions, the authors often resort to the phrase 
“white avoidance” as opposed to “white flight.”160 White avoidance is, 
arguably, a less polemical phrase than white flight, but it describes the 
same phenomenon. That is, it refers to the phenomenon of whites 
relocating to other areas (e.g., the suburbs) coinciding with the influx 
of African Americans to the areas whites are relocating from (or 
neighboring ones). Relying upon Ellen’s work, the authors state that 
“whites move into racially integrated neighborhoods in large 
numbers.”161 They further comment that while “[r]acial composition 
certainly matters to whites assessing a neighborhood, and very few 
whites move into predominantly black neighborhoods; . . . there is no 
pervasive tendency for whites to avoid more modestly integrated 
neighborhoods.”162 I have two questions in response. First, what was the 
racial composition of the racially integrated neighborhoods that whites 
 
160. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 116. (commenting that the “dominant 
metaphor for the process of white-to-black neighborhood transition is 
‘white flight’”). 
161. Id. at 208. 
162. Id. at 207. 
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moved into that served as the basis for Ellen’s conclusion? Knowing the 
racial composition of those neighborhoods is important to gauging the 
latter’s comfort level with experiencing neighborhood cohabitation with 
African Americans. Second, to what extent can the movement into 
racially integrated neighborhoods be characterized as gentrification, 
ultimately involving the displacement of blacks?  
The authors further note that “there is no doubt that [the] short 
distance moves from black districts into nearby, mostly middle-class 
white neighborhoods occurred in the 1970s on a vast scale, amounting 
in the aggregate to more than a million housing units shifting from 
white to black occupancy.”163 The authors do not attribute this shift in 
the complexion of the neighborhoods to white flight. Instead, they 
explain that numerous other factors were at work, including “normal 
turnover,” a higher level of black demand when compared to whites for 
those properties, and the emphasis of whites on non-racial factors.164 
Regarding the latter explanation, the authors conclude that while white 
avoidance cannot be entirely dismissed from the analysis, “[Ingrid 
Gould] Ellen shows persuasively that whites generally will not be much 
interested in minority neighborhoods if they perceive crime, bad 
schools, and housing deterioration to be concomitants of a large 
minority presence.”165 Without more explanation, citing these non-racial 
reasons as evidence that whites are not acting out of racial intolerance 
or animus is problematic. If the whites in Gould’s study often made the 
association between blacks and the negatives stated, then the 
conclusion that they were not acting out of racial bias and fleeing based 
upon that bias is questionable. What is true, however, is that no racial 
group is interested in residing in areas with high crime, bad schools, 
and dilapidated housing. 
Conclusion 
Moving Toward Integration asks the necessary complex, searching 
questions to engage in difficult conversations regarding how African 
Americans and whites live together—and apart—in the United States. 
It compiles crucial data to provide some answers to those questions. 
The arguments advanced, the historical background, and the empirical 
data provide the implements for progress in the area of residential racial 
integration. There is much I agree with in the book, but there are also 
significant areas of disagreement. 
I agree with the authors that the FHA, with the tool of disparate-
impact liability, is a potentially powerful instrument that could achieve 
substantial gains in the area of racially integrating housing. I note, 
 
163. Id. at 221. 
164. Id. at 227. 
165. Id. 
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however, that its potential has been dulled at times by various levels of 
government actors as well as the courts. Changes need to be made in 
the way in which disparate-impact theory is formulated to allow it to 
do the work of rooting out discriminatory effects that are offered in 
benign packages. In sum, the  United States Supreme Court has 
interpreted disparate-impact liability in a manner that makes it 
unlikely that litigants will prevail; thus, without some other 
interventions, the status quo of racial segregation will be preserved. 
I share the authors’ assessment that the FHA has accomplished 
significant progress in promoting integration by raising the racial 
consciousness of decision-makers as they make decisions concerning 
housing—who to rent to (landlords), where to rent or buy (realtors, 
brokers), who to sell to (owners, neighbors). Raised consciousness 
sometimes translates into less invidious racial discrimination in housing. 
My analysis highlights: (i) the need to exert pressure on local entities 
(municipalities, agencies, developers) to help diversify housing choices 
and integrate neighborhoods; (ii) the need to rethink HUD’s burden 
shifting framework for FHA disparate-impact claims and, perhaps, 
discard it altogether; (iii) the need to assist plaintiffs, where FHA 
litigation is necessary, with the first and third prongs of the burden-
shifting framework to establish connections between the actions and 
policies implemented by government and other entities and the damage 
inflicted on communities, and to devise equally effective alternatives to 
challenged practices; and (iv) the need to regulate banks and to refocus 
their attention on the interests of communities rather than merely on 
profit for shareholders. The task is to strike the right balance so that 
the well-being of communities is foregrounded, while at the same time 
allowing banks sufficient profitability to sustain themselves. 
I view Moving Toward Integration as a reminder that there are 
many who wish to have more integrated communities across the nation, 
and that strategies are needed to make those desires a reality. The 
authors are to be applauded not only for their articulation of 
noteworthy integration techniques and initiatives, but also for 
recognizing the value of integration and the benefits it brings to 
America’s multiracial society.166 
 
166. The Authors identify numerous positive outcomes, stating that, “racial 
integration tends to improve educational and job opportunities for young 
African-Americans, producing higher incomes and shrinking the black/white 
income gap.” Id. at 243. 
 
